CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—APPLICATION OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE TO MIRANDA VIOLATIONS by Henry, John J.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 14 14 (1992)
Issue 1 Article 4
1-1-1992
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—APPLICATION
OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE TO
MIRANDA VIOLATIONS
John J. Henry
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
John J. Henry, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—APPLICATION OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE TO MIRANDA VIOLATIONS, 14
W. New Eng. L. Rev. 109 (1992), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ApPLICATION OF THE HARMLESS 
ERROR RULE TO MIRANDA VIOLATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided Miranda v. 
Arizona. I The Miranda decision created a broad procedural rule2 for 
protecting the Fifth Amendment3 privilege against compulsory self­
incrimination.4 Under Miranda, if a defendant has made a statementS 
during a custodial interrogation,6 the prosecution must show that the 
defendant was given an adequate warning of his or her constitutional 
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2. The status of the Miranda rule is an anomaly in constitutional jurisprudence. See 
Stephen J. Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Perspective, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 
193, 235 (1987). The Miranda opinion alternately refers to its holding as a constitutional 
requirement and a procedural rule. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 478. Although the 
Court relied on the Fifth Amendment as a foundation for its rule, the opinion acknowl­
edged that the rule was not a constitutional requirement. Id. at 467 ("[W]e cannot say that 
the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent 
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted."). Nor is the rule 
founded on the Court's power to declare rules of procedure for the federal courts, as evi­
denced by the rule's applicability to state court proceedings. Thus, the survival of the 
Miranda rule has been described as an anomaly. Markman, supra, at 235. 
Congress has attempted to statutorily override the Miranda decision. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501 (1988). This statute provides that the giving of warnings similar to those required 
by Miranda is one factor to be considered in determining whether the defendant's state­
ment was voluntary. Under this statute, the failure to give the warnings does not necessar­
ily render a confession inadmissible. Id. The constitutionality of the statute has been 
upheld by at least one federal court of appeals. See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 
1129 (10th Cir. 1975). 
3. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any crimi­
nal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. For a history of the 
origins· of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, see 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458-63; Laurence A. Benner, Requiem/or Miranda: The Rehnquist 
Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1989). 
This Note will only discuss aspects of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con­
stitution. For a discussion of aspects of compulsory" self-incrimination clauses of state con­
stitutions, see generally Mary A. Crossley, Note, Miranda and the State Constitution: State 
Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1693 (1986). 
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
5. The Miranda rule applies to both inculpatory statements, those which implicate a 
suspect in an offense, and exculpatory statements, those made by a suspect in an attempt to 
avoid criminal liability. Id. 
6. For a discussion of the issues involved in defining a custodial interrogation, see 
infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text. 
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rights7 prior to giving the statement.8 Once the prosecution has 
shown that the warning was given, it must also show that the defend­
ant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her rights 
before giving the statement. 9 If the prosecution fails to do so, the 
statement cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief.1O 
The value of the Miranda decision as a prophylactic rule has been 
eroded by several doctrines and decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court. I I One such doctrine is the rule of harmless federal 
constitutional error, which allows a reviewing court to sustain a con­
viction even though illegally obtained evipence has been admitted at 
trial. I2 The rule of harmless constitutional error allows such a convic­
tion to be sustained if the state can show, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the error did not contribute to the conviction. 13 The ostensible 
purpose of this rule is to serve the concerns of judicial economy by 
avoiding a retrial that would result in a conviction despite the exclu­
sion of the illegally obtained evidence.l4 
Although the harmless error rule is useful in some contexts, the 
7. For a discussion of the requirements of an adequate Miranda warning, see infra 
notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
8. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
9. For a discussion of the Miranda waiver of rights standard, see infra notes 67-70 
and accompanying text. 
10. The prosecution may, however, use statements obtained in violation of Miranda 
to impeach the defendant's testimony. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
Prior to 1966, the Supreme Court determined the admissibility of statements made by 
a defendant under the coerced confession doctrine. Under this doctrine, the admissibility 
of a defendant's statement or statements is determined on a case by case basis, looking at 
the facts of each case to determine whether the statement was coerced and therefore viola­
tive of the defendant's due process rights. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 
514 (1963) (applying a totality of circumstances approach in determining whether a confes­
sion was coerced and thus violative of due process); see generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & 
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2 (1985). For a more complete history of 
the tests used by the Supreme Court prior to 1966 to determine the admissibility of a de­
fendant's confession, see Markman, supra note 2; Bettie E. Goldman, Note, Oregon v. 
Elstad: Boldly Stepping Backwards to Pre-Miranda Days?, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 245, 246­
53 (1985). 
11. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (creating a public safety 
exception to Miranda whereby police need not give a Miranda warning to a suspect in 
custody if an answer to the police questioning is necessary to protect the immediate safety 
of the public); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (creating an impeachment use 
exception); see also Goldman, supra note 10. 
12. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of harmless constitutional 
error, see infra notes 90-132 and accompanying text. 
13. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
14. See id. at 22; ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 81 (1970) 
(stating that the purpose of harmless error analysis is to "conserve judicial resources by 
enabling appellate courts to cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial error without becom­
ing mired in harmless error"). 
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rule does present some dangers, particularly when applied to a pro­
phylactic rule such as Miranda. One of the dangers of the rule of 
harmless constitutional error is that it impairs the right to a jury 
tria1. 1S By allowing a reviewing court to sustain a conviction despite 
the admission at trial of illegally obtained evidence, the harmless error 
rule allows the reviewing court to make determinations of the relative 
weight of that evidence. This is particularly dangerous in the context 
of Miranda violations, which always involve the admission of a de­
fendant's own statements. A defendant's statements have a unique ev­
identiary value, and the application of harmless error analysis to a 
Miranda violation must be undertaken in recognition of this eviden­
tiary role. 
This Note addresses two issues: whether the harmless error rule 
should be applied to Miranda violations, and what standard of harm­
lessness should be applied to the admission of evidence obtained in 
violation of Miranda. Section I of this Note discusses the rule of 
Miranda v. Arizona, and its subsequent implementation and clarifica­
tion by both the United States Supreme Court and the lower courts. 
Section II discusses the origins of the rule of harmless federal constitu­
tional error and the United States Supreme Court's current harmless 
error jurisprudence. 16 Section III discusses Butzin v. Wood,11 a case 
15. See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 430 (1980). Professor Goldberg suggests that the harmless 
error rule impairs the right to a jury trial by establishing an "appellate jury" that sits to 
determine what effect the illegal evidence had on the original trial jury. Id. This violates 
the right to a jury trial by allowing the appellate judges, rather than a lay jury, to determine 
the facts of the case. To Professor Goldberg, the usurpation of the jury function is "[t]he 
greatest cost of the constitutional harmless error rule." Id. (footnote omitted). 
See also Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 
CoLUM. L. REV. 79, 81 (1988). Professors Stacy and Dayton suggest that the Supreme 
Court's harmless error jurisprudence is flawed in three respects. First, the Court ignores 
the premise of the protection of the Bill of Rights in applying the harmless error rule. 
Second, the Court has applied different standards of harmless error depending on the par­
ticular right involved. Third, the Court has not been clear on the scope of review of deter­
minations of harmlessness. Id. 
16. The United States Supreme Court has not yet directly applied the harmless error 
rule to Miranda violations. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443-45 (1984) (leav­
ing the issue open); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (applying harmless 
error analysis to admission of coerced confession); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 
2652 n.22 (1990) (stating that the state court was free on remand to apply harmless error 
doctrine to a Miranda violation). 
In Berkemer, the state argued that the admission of the suspect's statement, although 
obtained in violation of Miranda, was harmless error. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 443. The 
Court, however, refused to apply a harmless error analysis to the Miranda violation for 
three reasons. Id. at 443-45. First, the issue was not presented to any of the lower courts. 
Second, the defendant had made two different statements to the police, only one of which 
was obtained in violation of Miranda. The statement that was obtained in violation of 
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that illustrates the difficulties encountered in applying the harmless 
error rule to Miranda violations. Lastly, Section IV discusses the is­
sues of whether the harmless error rule should be applied to Miranda 
violations, and under what standard of harmlessness these violations 
are to be reviewed. This Note concludes that the harmless error rule 
should be applied to Miranda violations. This Note also suggests that 
when a reviewing court employs harmless error analysis in determin­
ing whether the admission of evidence obtained in violation of 
Miranda was harmless, the court should employ a standard of harm­
lessness which focuses on the possible effect that the erroneously ad­
mitted evidence may have had on the jury verdict. 
I. THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE 
A. Miranda v. Arizona 18 
The Miranda decision involved the consolidation of four appeals 
from various state courtS. 19 Each of these appeals involved "incom­
municado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmos­
phere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings 
of constitutional rights."20 All of the confessions were admitted 
against the defendants at their respective trials.21 The Supreme Court 
was faced with the issue of determining the admissibility of the confes­
sions under the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self­
incrimination.22 
The starting point for the Court's analysis was that its holding 
was "not an innovation in our jurisprudence."23 The Court recog­
nized that the Fifth Amendment privilege was adopted by the Framers 
"only after centuries of persecution and struggle" in England.24 The 
Court went on to detail the history of the sources of the privilege 
Miranda was probably more prejudicial to the defendant than the one that did not violate 
Miranda. Therefore, it was unlikely that the error was harmless. Third, the case arose in a 
procedural posture that made it difficult to determine whether the error was harmless. The 
suspect had pleaded no contest to the charges against him and therefore he did not have the 
opportunity to present his own evidence or to rebut the prosecution's evidence. Id. 
17. 886 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2595 (1990). 
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
19. See id. at 491. 
20. Id. at 445. 
21. In each of the consolidated cases, the defendant's statement was ·not obtained in 
violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and would, 
therefore, be admissible under the coerced confession doctrine. See id. at 457; see also 
supra note 10. 
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
23. Id. at 442. 
24. Id. 
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against compulsory self-incrimination.25 According to the Court, this 
privilege was jeopardized by the pressures inherent in modern custo­
dial interrogation.26 The Court found that, in order to protect an indi­
vidual's Fifth and Sixth Amendment27 rights from the pressures 
inherent in a custodial interrogation, the police need to warn the indi­
vidual of his or her rights prior to questioning. 28 
The warning required by Miranda has four essential compo­
nents. 29 The first requirement of an adequate Miranda warning is that 
the individual in custody be told that he or she has a right to remain 
silent. 30 Second, the individual needs to be told that anything he or 
she says can be used against him or her.3l Third, the police need to 
25. !d. at 458-66. Chief Justice Warren, the author of the majority opinion, found 
that the sources of the Fifth Amendment stretch back as far as biblical times. Id. at 458 
n.27. One of the significant historical events that Chief Justice Warren cited as a source of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was the Lilburn trial, 
which occurred in England in 1637. Id. at 459. John Lilburn was a political prisoner who 
was made to take the Court of Star Chamber Oath, which required him to answer all 
questions that the chamber posed to him on any subject. Lilburn's refusal to take the oath 
was ultimately responsible for the abolishment of the Star Chamber by Parliament. Ac­
cording to Chief Justice Warren, the principles to which Lilburn appealed gained popular 
acceptance in England and were brought over to the colonies where they eventually found 
their way into the Bill of Rights. Id. 
26. Id. at 445-58. In a lengthy discussion, the Court detailed the types of coercion 
often employed by police in interrogating a suspect. The first type was physical abuse of 
suspects by police. Id. at 446 (citing People v. Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857 (N.Y. 1965) (per 
curiam) (police beat, kicked, and placed lighted cigarette butts on the back of an accused in 
an attempt to elicit a response incriminating a third party». 
According to the Court, however, physical abuse was not necessary for a finding of 
coercion. The Court stated that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psy­
chologically rather than physically oriented. . .. '[T]his Court has recognized that coercion 
can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark 
of an unconstitutional inquisition.''' Id. at 448 (citation omitted) (quoting Blackburn v. 
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960». 
The Court looked to two police interrogation manuals for support of the proposition 
that psychological coercion was important to the police interrogation process. Id. at 449­
50 (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFES­
SIONS (1962); CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
(1956». These works detailed various tactics and ploys aimed at weakening the suspect's 
will and thus eliciting an incriminating response. The works stress that it is important to 
interrogate the suspect in private, and to use such ploys as feigning sympathy with the 
suspect in order to elicit an incriminating response. Id. 
27. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI. 
28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
29. See id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Harlan began with a 
summary of the requirements of the rule created by the majority. Id. 
30. Id. at 467-68. 
31. Id. at 469. This requirement was necessary to ensure that the defendant was 
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tell the suspect that he or she has the right to have counsel present 
during interrogation.32 Fourth, the individual nee4s to be told that, if 
indigent, he or she has the right to appointed counsel. 33 
Under Miranda, the prosecution needs to show not only that the 
individual wa~ given the warning, but also that the individual waived 
his or her right to remain silent and right to counsel before making a 
statement during a custodial interrogation which the prosecution in­
tends to use at trial.34 The Court placed a "heavy burden" on the 
government to show that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently 
waived the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the 
right to have counsel present during interrogation. 35 Any evidence 
that the individual was "threatened, tricked, or cajoled" into giving a 
waiver would prohibit the admission of the statement. 36 
The Court also addressed the issue of what must happen if the 
suspect has asserted his or her rights. If a suspect invokes the right to 
silence, the Court stated that "the interrogation must cease."37 If, on 
the other hand, the individual invokes his or her right to counsel, the 
Court stated that questioning must cease until a lawyer is present.38 
Although the Miranda Court intended to create a "bright line" 
rule,39 the Court gave little guidance as to how the rule was to be 
aware of the consequences of his or her waiver of rights and, therefore, ensure that the 
suspect intelligently exercised the, privilege. Id. 
32. Id. at 471. The Court stated that "an individual held for interrogation must be 
clearly informed that he [or she] has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer 
with him [or her] during interrogation." Id. (emphasis added). ' 
To the Miranda Court, the presence of counsel served several important goals: 
If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can 
mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood 
that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless 
exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also 
help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police 
and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial. 
Id. at 470 (citing Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-48 (1958) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting». 
33. Id. at 473 ("Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to 
consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that [the suspect] can 
consult with a lawyer if [the suspect] has one or has the funds to obtain one."). 
34. Id. at 475. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 476. 
37. Id. at 474. 
38. Id. 
39. The Court granted certiorari in the Miranda case to give "concrete constitutional 
guidelines" for lower courts to follow. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42. The Court expressly 
rejected a case by case approach. See id. at 468 ("[W)e will not pause to inquire in individ­
ual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given."); 
cf. Hon. William H. Erickson, The Unfulfilled Promise of Miranda v. Arizona, 24 AM. 
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implemented. For example, the Court stated that the warnings and 
waiver were only required when an individual was subject to custodial 
interrogation, but did not adequately define what the term "custodial 
interrogation" meant. 40 Also, the Court did not state whether it was 
necessary for law enforcement personnel to use the exact language 
used by the Court in its decision when giving a warning to a suspect,41 
or whether a suspect could ever be interrogated after invoking his or 
her rights.42 The following section discusses the subsequent United 
States Supreme Court decisions clarifying these complex issues. 
B. Implementation of the Miranda Rule 
1. Custodial Interrogation 
The threshold question in any Miranda analysis is whether the 
suspect was subjected to custodial interrogation.43 IIi implementing 
the Miranda rule, many subsequent lower court decisions used a total­
ity of the circumstances approach in determining whether the suspect 
was in custody at the time of the interrogation.44 These lower court 
decisions emphasized several factors, including whether the investiga­
tion had focused on the individual being questioned,45 whether there 
was probable cause to arrest the suspect at the time of the question­
ing,46 and whether the subject matter of the offense was of the type 
normally associated with a criminal investigation.47 
CRIM. L. REV. 291 (1987) (suggesting that Miranda failed in its promise to provide con­
crete constitutional guidelines). 
40. The Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation only as "questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de­
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
41. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
42. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text. 
43. See Jefferson V. Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What 
Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L. REv. 699 (1974). 
44. See, e.g., Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4, 7 (9th Cir. 1967); People v. 
Merchant, 67 Cal. Rptr. 459,461-62 (0. App. 1968). 
45. See, e.g., Arnold, 382 F.2d at 7 n.3 (stating that Miranda did not apply to ques­
tioning of an individual until the investigative process has become accusatorial); Merchant, 
67 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (holding that when investigation reaches stage of accusation suspect is 
entitled to warning of constitutional rights prior to interrogation) (citing Escobedo v. Illi­
nois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); People v. Dorado, 
398 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1965». 
46. See, e.g., People v. P., 233 N.E.2d 255, 258 (N.Y. 1967) (whether there was 
probable cause to arrest the suspect is one factor to be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances analysis). 
47. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 376 F.2d 595, 597 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding 
that routine civil tax investigation does not require Miranda warnings, even though the 
suspect was in custody at time of investigation), rev'd, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 
116 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:109 
Eventually, however, the Supreme Court rejected the totality of 
the circumstance approach in determining whether an individual was 
in custody at the time he or she made a statement.48 Instead, the 
Court has come to focus solely on the restraint on the person's free­
dom of movement.49 Under Supreme Court precedent, there is no re­
quirement that there be a formal arrest of the suspect before the 
warnings are required. 50 Rather, the test is whether there has been a 
"restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a 
formal arrest."51 This determination is to be made from the viewpoint 
of a reasonable person in the suspect's position. 52 Thus, even though a 
particular individual may have a subjective belief that he or she is in 
custody, the police need not give Miranda warnings unless that belief 
is reasonable.53 
48. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,442 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 
U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
49. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495. Beheler and 
Mathiason involved factual circumstances that were nearly identical. In both cases, the 
suspects were requested by a police officer to appear at the police station for questioning 
regarding their possible involvement in crimes. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122-23; Mathiason, 
429 U.S. at 492-93. In both cases, the suspects were expressly told, prior to interrogation, 
that they were not under arrest and were free to leave at any time. Both Beheler and 
Mathiason made inculpatory statements during the ensuing questioning, and these state­
ments were subsequently used against them at their respective trials. The United States 
Supreme Court held in both cases that the suspects were not in custody for Miranda pur­
poses. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495. In both cases the Court 
emphasized that the suspects were expressly told that they were free to leave at any time. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122; Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495. 
50. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125. 
51. Id. (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). 
52. Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984) (holding that Miranda warning is not 
required when suspect is questioned during routine traffic stop because a reasonable person 
would not believe that he or she was in custody). 
53. See id. There are several factual situations in which an important issue is 
whether a court should employ a subjective or an objective test of custody. The first situa­
tion is one in which a police officer approaches a suspect for questioning with the intention 
of arresting the suspect if he or she attempts to leave, but does not formally arrest the 
person or communicate his or her intention to the suspect. The second situation is one in 
which the suspect may have an objectively reasonable belief that he or she is in custody 
even though the investigating officer has no intention of arresting the suspect. The third 
situation is one in which the individual may have only a subjective belief that he or she is in 
custody. 
The Supreme Court has defined the appropriate test as "how a reasonable man in the 
suspect's position would have understood his situation." Id. The Court rejected the no­
tion that the police officer's intent or plan is to be considered in determining whether an 
individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, except to the extent that that intent is com­
municated to the suspect. Id. This view is logical because the rationale behind the 
Miranda decision is that warnings of constitutional rights are needed prior to custodial 
interrogation in order to protect the individual's Fifth Amendment rights from the pres­
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The Court has also addressed several cases dealing with the issue 
of defining interrogation for Miranda purposes.54 Under the current 
test, promulgated by the Court in Rhode Island v. Innis,55 interroga­
tion includes both express questioning and its "functional 
equivalent."56 In Innis, the Court defined the "functional equivalent" 
of questioning as "any words or actions on the part of the police (other 
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect."57 Under this definition of interrogation, a police 
practice, other than express questioning, designed at soliciting infor­
sures inherent in custodial interrogation. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text. 
The fact that a police officer intends to arrest an individual is not relevant to the state of 
mind of the suspect whose Fifth Amendment interests are at stake. 
However, considering that the main focus of Miranda was that the psychological pres­
sures inherent in custodial interrogation jeopardized the individual's Fifth Amendment 
privilege, it is arguable that the courts should focus solely on the SUbjective state of mind of 
the suspect. Although this approach would be consistent with Miranda, the Court has 
instead focused only on the reasonable beliefs of the suspect. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 
441-42. 
The rule that focuses on the reasonableness of the suspect's belief has the benefit of 
ease of application. If the courts were to use a subjective test in this area, they would be 
forced to take into account an infinite number of characteristics in determining whether the 
individual had an actual belief that he or she was in custody. Id. Moreover, the police 
would have a nearly impossible task of determining which suspects would believe that they 
were in custody and thus need to be warned of their rights and which suspects did not 
believe that they were in custody. See People v. Merchant, 67 Cal. Rptr. 459, 461 (Ct. 
App. 1968) (holding that a suspect's reasonable belief that he or she was in custody may be 
used as a basis for finding that he or she was in custody for Miranda purposes); People v. 
P., 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (N.Y. 1967) (applying a test that determined custody on the basis 
of the suspect's reasonable views because, unlike a subjective test, "it is not solely depen­
dent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor does it 
place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every 
person whom they question" (citing Williams v. United States, 381 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967); 
Gaudio v. State, 230 A.2d 700 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967»). 
54. See. e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 300-01. 
57. Id. In Innis, the police had received a report from a cab driver that he had just 
been robbed by a man wielding a shotgun and that he had dropped the man off in a certain 
area. Id. at 293. The police then spotted Innis in the area where the cab driver had let his 
assailant off and arrested him. The police believed that Innis had hidden the shotgun some­
where in the area of the arrest scene, which was near a school for handicapped children. 
After the police arrested Innis, they gave him several sets of Miranda warnings and Innis 
invoked his right to remain silent. The police then transported him from the scene of his 
arrest in a police patrol car. Id. at 294. 
During the drive to the police station, one of the patrolmen stated to another: "there's 
a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them 
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves." Id. at 294-95. Hearing 
this conversation, Innis told the police to return to the scene of the arrest and he would 
show them where the weapon was hidden. The weapon proved to be the one used in an 
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mation from the suspect will not be considered interrogation unless a 
reasonable police officer would consider the practice as reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. S8 
2. Adequacy of Warning 
Once it has been established that the individual's statement was 
the product of custodial interrogation, the next step in a Miranda 
analysis is to determine whether the suspect was given an adequate 
warning of his or her rights. S9 In California v. Prysock,60 and Duck­
worth v. Eagan,61 the United States Supreme Court declared that there 
is no requirement that the police use a warning which mimics the pre­
cise language of the warning in the Miranda opinion.62 However, it is 
necessary that the warning used by the police be the "fully effective 
earlier, unrelated, murder of a cab driver, and Innis was subsequently convicted of this 
murder. Id. at 295-96. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the 
defendant's decision to return to the arrest scene, and his subsequent incriminating state­
ments, were not the product of interrogation. Id. at 302. 
For a more complete discussion of the Innis decision, see Jane Schussler, Note, 
Searching for the Proper Balance in Defining a Miranda Interrogation: Three Perspectives 
on Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 787 (1981). 
58. See United States ex rei. Church v. De Robertis, 771 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985); 
see also Jonathan L. Marks, Note, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower 
Court Misapplication of the Innis Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1073 
(1989). 
The Court has also used this definition of interrogation to create an exception to- the 
Miranda rule for standard questions involved in the booking procedure. Pennsylvania v. 
Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2650 (1990). The exception applies to questions designed to elicit 
the suspect's name, address, date of birth, and other similar information. Id.; see also 
United States v. Webster, 769 F.2d 487, 491-92 (8th Cir. 1985). 
The lower courts have also held that an officer's request for clarification of a suspect's 
volunteered statement does not fit within the definition of interrogation under Miranda, as 
long as it is not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See, e.g., United 
States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1032 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1987). 
59. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
60. 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam). 
61. 492 U.S. 195 (1989). 
62. Id. at 202; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360. In Miranda, the Court used the following 
language in its holding: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has 
a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. However, the Court did use different language at other points in 
its opinion: 
[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to 
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that 
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
Id. at 479. 
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equivalent"63 of the language used in the Miranda opinion.64 In order 
to satisfy the Miranda strictures, the warning that the police give must 
"touch all of the bases" of the language used in Miranda.6S Therefore, 
even if the police use language that arguably dilutes the protection 
given suspects by a Miranda warning,66 the warning will still be ade­
63. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359-60 (citing Miranda, 384U.S. at 476). In Miranda, the 
Court stated that "[t]he warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our 
opinion today are, in the absence ofa fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissi­
bility of any statement made by a defendant." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added). 
64. Duckwonh, 492 U.S. at 202; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360. In Prysock, the suspect 
was given the following warning: 
Your legal rights, Mr. Prysock, is [sic] follows: Number One, you have the right 
to remain silent. This means you don't have to talk to me at all unless you so 
desire. . .. If you give up your right to remain silent, anything you say can and 
will be used as evidence against you in a court of law. . .. You have the right to 
talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with you while you 
are being questioned, and all during the questioning. 
Id. at 356 (alteration in original). 
The Prysock Court indicated that several lower court decisions had found Miranda 
warnings inadequate because the warnings linked the right to have an attorney to some 
future point in time and, consequently, did not inform the suspect of his right to have an 
attorney present during interrogation. Id. at 360 (citing United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 
134 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); People v. Bolinski, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347 (Ct. App. 1968». 
The Court went on to distinguish the case before it from those cases by emphasizing that 
the warning that the police gave Prysock did not limit his right to have an attorney present. 
Id. at 360-61. The Court emphasized that the warning "clearly conveyed rights to a law­
yer in general, including the right 'to a lawyer before you are questioned, ... while you are 
being questioned, and all during the questioning.''' [d. at 361 (quoting Appendix A to 
Petition for Certiorari at 9-10, California v. Prysock, 453 t.!.S. 355 (1981». 
In Duckworth, the suspect was given the following warning: 
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the 
right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You 
have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to 
have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and 
presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of 
giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, ifyou wish, ifand when you 
go to coun. If you wish to answer questions now' without a lawyer present, you 
have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to 
stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer. 
Duckwonh, 492 U.S. at 198 (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1555-56 (7th 
Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 195 (1989». 
The Duckwonh Court found that this warning was adequate because it "touched all of 
the bases required by Miranda." [d. at 203. Again, the Court emphasized that the warn­
ings given int"ormed the suspect of his right to have counsel present during interrogation. 
Id. at 205. 
65. Duckwonh, 492 U.S. at 203. 
66. See Yale Kamisar, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little Noticed Miranda Case That 
May Cause Much Mischief, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 554 (1989). Professor Kamisar sug­
gests that the warning given by the police in Duckworth "colored" the defendant's right to 
have counsel present during questioning by implying that there was no way that the defend­
ant would be able to talk to a lawyer during his stay in the police station. [d. 
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quate as long as the suspect is advised of his or her four Miranda 
rights. 
3. Waiver of Rights 
If the police have given the suspect an adequate warning, it is 
then necessary to determine whether the suspect waived his or her 
rights to counsel and to remain silent before making any statement.67 
The test used to determine whether the suspect waived his or her 
rights requires the court to determine whether, looking at the totality 
of the circumstances, the suspect knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli­
gently relinquished his or her rights.68 
Although the prosecution's burden in establishing a waiver is 
high, there is no requirement that the prosecution establish an express 
waiver by the suspect.69 The prosecution may show by the totality of 
the circumstances that the suspect intended to relinquish his or her 
rights. These circumstances include the suspect's age, intelligence, ex­
perience in the criminal justice system, and the conduct of the police 
surrounding the waiver.70 
4. Reinterrogation 
Although the Miranda decision purported not to allow the police 
to interrogate the suspect after the individual has invoked his or her 
rights, in Michigan v. Mosley 71 the Court allowed the police to reinter­
rogate a suspect after an invocation of rights.72 Under the holdings of 
Mosley and Edwards v. Arizona,73 the determination of whether a 
statement made by a defendant in response to a second interrogation 
67. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
68. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481 (1981) (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 
U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979); Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387,404 (1977); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); John­
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938». 
69. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) ("An express written or oral 
statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong 
proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to 
establish waiver."). 
70. Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979). 
71. 423 U.S. 96 (1975); see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 481-82. 
72. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. In Mosley, the Court found that a per se rule that 
prohibits the police from interrogating a suspect at any time after the suspect has invoked 
his or her rights would produce absurd results in practice. Id. at 102-03. 
For a discussion of the issues involved in determining whether a suspect has invoked 
his or her Miranda rights, see generally Charles R. Shreffier, Jr., Note, Judicial Approaches 
to the Ambiguous Request/or Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
460 (1987). 
73. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
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session is admissible depends on which right the suspect has invoked. 74 
If the suspect invoked his or her right to remain silent, the admissibil­
ity of the statement depends on whether the police "scrupulously 
honored" the suspect's invocation of the right. 75 
In Mosley, the defendant invoked his right to silence after the 
police gave him a Miranda warning.76 After a two hour break, the 
police questioned him again and he gave an incriminating statement. 
The Mosley Court found that the police "scrupulously honored" Mos­
ley's right to cut off questioning.77 In so doing, the Court emphasized 
several factors, including the time lapse between the two questioning 
sessions, the difference in the subject matter of the two questioning 
sessions, and the giving of a Miranda warning by the police before 
each questioning session. 78 
The Supreme Court, however, has developed a more demanding 
test for determining the admissibility of a statement made by a defend­
ant after the defendant has invoked his or her right to counsel. If the 
suspect has invoked his or her right to counsel, in order for a subse­
quent statement to be admissible, the resumption of interrogation 
must have been initiated by the suspect.79 Even if the defendant indi­
cates, without prompting by the police, that he or she wishes to re­
sume speaking with the police, the officers must also obtain a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the suspect's Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights prior to any subsequent interrogation. 80 
74. See id. at 481-82; Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103. 
75. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04 n.lO (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 
(1966». 
76. Id. at 97. 
77. Id. at 104. 
78. Id. 
79. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). In order for a defendant to 
initiate the conversation, he or she must only begin a "generalized discussion" about the 
subject matter of the investigation. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) 
(plurality opinion); see also Alan C. Blanco, Note, It's Better the Second Time Around­
Reinterrogation a/Custodial Suspects Under Oregon v. Bradshaw, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 899, 
899 (1984). The concern in Bradshaw was defining initiation for purposes of the Edwards 
rule: 
Eight ofthe nine justices on the Court agreed that Edwards called for [a] two step 
inquiry and that the first step of the inquiry established a per se rule prohibiting 
interrogation when the arrestee had not initiated the renewed conversation. 
However, the Court was unable to agree on the definition of initiation. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
80. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9. 
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5. 	 Non-Applicability of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
Doctrine to Miranda Violations 
If a statement does follow a Miranda violation, a statement ob­
tained during a second interrogation session may nevertheless be ad­
missible. The admissibility of such a statement depends on whether 
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine81 is applied to Miranda vio­
lations. Under this doctrine, evidence that is derived from an illegal 
source must be excluded at trial, even though the evidence is not the 
direct result of the initial violation.82 Thus, if the police violate a de­
fendant's Fourth Amendment83 rights and obtain a confession as a 
result of that violation, the confession should be suppressed as the de­
rivative fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation, even though the 
confession would be admissible under the Fifth Amendment. 84 
In Oregon v. Elstad, 8S the Supreme Court refused to apply this 
derivative fruit doctrine to Miranda violations.86 The Court drew a 
distinction between a constitutional violation and a violation of 
Miranda, which, according to the Court, is merely a procedure for 
protecting a constitutional right. 87 The Court held that the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine only applies to constitutional violations.88 
Therefore, the doctrine does not apply to the derivative fruits of a 
Miranda violation unless the police conduct was so coercive as to be­
come violative of the Fifth Amendment. 89 
81. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that 
prohibits the use at trial of evidence indirectly obtained from an illegal source. See Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (prohibiting the use at trial of a confession ob­
tained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra 
note 10, §§ 9.3-9.5. The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the doctrine is to 
deter law enforcement personnel from violating constitutional rights. Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 486 (1976). 
82. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Hanes, 446 U.S. 
620 (1980». 
83. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
84. 	 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485. 
85. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). In Elstad, the defendant made two statements to the police. 
The first was in violation of Miranda because he was in custody and had not yet been given 
a Miranda warning. Id. at 301. The police gave Elstad a Miranda warning and he then 
made a second incriminating statement. Id. at 301-02. 
86. 	 Id. at 304. 
87. /d. at 306-07 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974»; see also supra note 2. 
88. 	 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. 
89. See id. If the standard version of the fruits doctrine were applied in a situation in 
which the police obtained an initial statement in violation of Miranda and then obtained a 
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II. THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE 

After Miranda v. Arizona,90 but before the advent ofthe harmless 
error doctrine, the admission of a defendant's statement obtained in 
violation of the Miranda rule resulted in automatic reversal of a con­
viction.91 However, after the advent of the harmless error doctrine, it 
became possible for a conviction to stand even though the trial court 
had admitted a statement in violation of Miranda. A reviewing court 
can now avoid reversal by applying the harmless error rule. The fol­
lowing section discusses the origins of the harmless constitutional er­
ror rule and its current status. 
A. 	 Development of the Harmless Error Rule for Federal 
Constitutional Violations 
During the latter half of the 1960's, as both the lower courts and 
the Supreme Court were grappling with emerging constitutional pro­
tections for criminal defendants, the Supreme Court began to develop 
the doctrine of harmless constitutional error.92 Fahy v. Connecticut 93 
was the first Supreme Court case to suggest that a federal constitu­
tional error could be held harmless.94 Although the Fahy Court did 
second statement which is not in violation of Miranda, the second statement would proba­
bly be suppressed even though it was not obtained in violation of Miranda. Because the 
suspect gave the initial statement, he or she would feel pressured to give a further statement 
when asked by the police or, alternatively, feel there was nothing to lose since the "cat was 
already out ofthe bag." Arguably, under the fruits analysis, the second statement would be 
the result of the first Miranda violation because the police would not have obtained the 
second statement if they had not obtained the first. However, by not applying the doctrine 
to Miranda violations, the Court has allowed prosecutors to use statements at trial even 
though such statements are arguably tainted by a prior Miranda violation. See generally 
Goldman, supra note 10. 
90. 	 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
91. The Miranda Court itself reversed the convictions in the cases before it without 
an analysis of whether the defendants were prejudiced by the admission of their statements 
at trial. See id. 
92. The rule of harmless federal constitutional error began to emerge "in the back­
wash" of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1962) (applying the Fourth Amendment's exclusion­
ary rule to state court action). Goldberg, supra note 15, at 423. 
93. 	 375 U.S. 85 (1963). 
94. Id. In Fahy, the prosecution introduced evidence at trial which was obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and was therefore inadmissible under the exclusionary 
rule of Mapp v. Ohio. Id. at 91 (citing Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655). Nonetheless, the Connecti­
cut Supreme Court of Errors applied the Connecticut harmless error provision, which 
states that a reviewing court should not set aside a conviction if "it is of the opinion that 
the errors have not materially injured the appellant or plaintiff in error," and refused to 
reverse the resulting conviction. State v. Fahy, 183 A.2d 256, 262 (Conn. 1962) (citing 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-265; State v. Goldberger, 173 A. 216 (Conn. 1934); Carrol v. 
Arnold, 141 A. 657 (Conn. 1928); State v. Stevens, 31 A. 496 (Conn. 1894); I JOHN H. 
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not state that a harmless error rule could be applied to federal consti­
tutional violations, in Chapman v. California,9s the United States 
Supreme Court formulated a harmless error rule that could be applied 
to the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Federal 
Constitution. 
In Chapman, the defendant was charged with murder and chose 
not to testify at his trial,96 Acting pursuant to a California state con­
stitutional provision, the prosecution commented extensively at trial 
on the defendant's failure to testify.97 After the trial, but before the 
appeal to the California Supreme Court, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Griffin v. California.98 In Griffin, the Court held that 
the provision of the California Constitution at issue violated the de­
fendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.99 Nevertheless, 
the California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in Chapman by 
applying the state's harmless error rule. 100 
On Chapman's appeal, the United States Supreme Court held 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW § 21 (3d ed. 1940», rev'd, 375 U.S. 85 
(1963). 
Without stating whether a state's harmless error rule could be applied to a federal 
constitutional violation, the United States Supreme Court found that, because the admis­
sion of this evidence was prejudicial to the defendant, application of a harmless error rule 
was inappropriate. Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86. The Court found that the evidence was prejudi­
cial to Fahy in several ways. First, it made the trial testimony more credible. Id. at 88. 
The arresting officer had testified that he found a jar of paint and a paint brush in Fahy's 
car. An expert witness also testified that the paint found in the car was of the type used in 
the crime and the brush was the same width as that used in the crime. Id. at 89. Second, 
Fahy had made incriminating statements to the police when he was arrested. Id. at 90. 
Although these admissions were more damaging than the paint and brush, they were 
"probably" made in response to confrontation with the illegally seized evidence. Therefore, 
the Fourth Amendment violation was not harmless. Id. at 91-92. 
95. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
96. Id. at 19. 
97. Id. The prosecutor was acting pursuant to a section of the California Constitu­
tion then in force which provided that "in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies 
or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case 
against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered 
by the court or the jury." Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (repealed 1974». 
98. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
99. Id. at 613. 
100. People v. Teale, 404 P.2d 209, 220-21 (Cal. 1965), rev'd sub nom. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The California harmless error rule then in force provided: 
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on the ground of 
misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or 
for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of 
procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evi­
dence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice. 
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 1/2 (repealed 1966). 
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that a harmless error rule could be applied to the case. 101 The first 
issue decided by the Court was whether state or federal law gov­
erned.102 Because the appeal involved the application of a state's 
harmless error rule to rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, 
the Court found that federal law applied. 103 
The Court then answered the major issue on appeal: whether de­
nial of a federal constitutional right could ever be deemed harmless. 104 
Chapman had argued that all federal constitutional errors must always 
be deemed harmful, and, therefore, a violation of a federal constitu­
tional right would automatically result in a new trial.105 The Court, 
however, rejected this argument and found instead that some federal 
constitutional errors could be deemed harmless. I06 
Justice Black, writing for the majority, looked to the federal stat­
utory harmless error provisions in order to support his position. 107 
Although these provisions do not distinguish between violations of the 
Federal Constitution and statutory rules, they could not be used to 
apply to violations of the Federal Constitution. This is because the 
United States Supreme Court, rather than Congress, stands as the ulti­
mate arbiter of the Constitution. lOS For Justice Black, a federal rule of 
harmless constitutional error would "serve a very useful purpose inso­
101. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21. 
102. Id. at 20-21. 
103. Id. at 21. The Court stated that it could not "leave to the States the fonnula­
tion of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infrac­
tions by the States offederally guaranteed rights." Id. States are, however, free to fashion 
harmless error rules for violations of state procedure or state law. Id.; see also Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991). 
In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the application of a state's harmless error 
provision to federal constitutional violations was an issue that should be left to the states. 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In his view, instead of fashioning a new 
rule offederal constitutional harmless error, the Court should simply have remedied consti­
tutional violations from the application of a state's harmless error rule by striking down 
unconstitutional harmless error provisions and applications. Id. at 48 n.2. 
104. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22. 
105. Id. at 21. 
106. [d. at 22. 
107. Id. Justice Black relied on 28 U.S.c. § 2111 and Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(a). 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988) provides: "[o]n the hearing of any appeal or writ 
of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record 
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
Id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) provides: "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity 
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 52(a). 
108. For a discussion of the distinctions between the congressionally created hann­
less error provisions and the judicially created standard of hannless constitutional error, 
see United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 460-62 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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far as [it would] block setting aside convictions for small errors or 
defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result 
of the trial." 109 
Once Justice Black established that a rule of federal constitutional 
harmless error could exist, the next step in his analysis was to deter­
mine what the appropriate harmless error rule would be. 110 Here, Jus­
tice Black used essentially the same standard as that discussed by the 
Court in Fahy. In Fahy, the standard discussed was "whether there is 
a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have 
contributed to the conviction." III In Chapman, the Court elaborated 
on this standard by noting that the prosecution must carry the burden 
of showing that the error complained of was in fact harmless. 112 The 
Court stated that the rule, to be applied was "that before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to 
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."ll3 
In the majority opinion, Justice Black did acknowledge that there 
are "some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their'infrac­
tion can never be treated as harmless error.""4 These rights include 
the right not to have a coerced confession admitted at trial, lIS the right 
to counsel, and the right to be adjudged by an impartial magistrate. I 16 
However, the Court did not elaborate on what made these particular 
rights so significant that their infraction could not be harmless, other 
than by classifying them as "basic to a fair trial." 117 
B. Federal Constitutional Errors Subject to Harmless Error Analysis 
Although the Chapman decision did not elaborate on what con­
stitutional rights could be subjected to harmless error analysis, after 
109. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. 
110. Id. at 22-23. 
111. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). 
112. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
113. Id. In Chapman, the Court ultimately found that the error complained of was 
not harmless, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Id. at 26. Although there was a 
strong web of circumstantial evidence, the Court found that the prosecutor's comments 
allowed the jury to draw only inferences that were favorable to the state in determining 
guilt. Id. at 25. 
114. Id. at 23. 
115. But see Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991) (holding that 
admission of a coerced confession is a "trial error" which can be subjected to harmless 
error analysis). 
116. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
(right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge». 
117. Id. 
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the Chapman decision, the Court began to expand upon the list of 
constitutional violations that may be considered harmless. 118 As the 
law stands now, the Court has assumed that most errors are subject to 
the Chapman analysis. 119 In fact, there is a "strong presumption" that 
"if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudica­
tor, ... any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harm­
less-error analysis."120 
In a recent Supreme Court case, the Court applied harmless error 
analysis to the admission of a coerced confession. l2l In Arizona v. 
Fulminante,122 the Court expressly rejected the Chapman assertion 
that harmless error analysis was inapplicable to the admission of a 
coerced confession. 123 The Court, through the opinion of Chief Jus­
tice Rehnquist, drew a distinction between a "trial error" and a 
"structural defect in the trial process."124 According to the Court, 
any trial error can be subjected to harmless error analysis, while a 
structural defect cannot. 12S The Court defined "trial error" as "error 
which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and 
which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other 
evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 126 
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "structural defects" affect 
the entire trial process. Examples of these structural defects are the 
deprivation of the right to an impartial judge, the unlawful exclusion 
of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, the deprivation 
118. See. e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580 (1986) (due process right against 
burden shifting jury instruction); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (right to 
adduce exculpatory evidence at trial); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,684 (1986) 
(failure to permit cross examination of witness concerning possible bias); Rushen v. Spain, 
464 U.S. 114, 118 (1983) (per curiam) (denial of right to be present at all stages of trial); 
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 378 (1972) (admission of confession obtained in viola­
tion of Sixth Amendment); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (violation of 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 
(1968) (same); see generally Stacy & Dayton, sUp;'YJ note 15. 
119. See Rose, 478 U.S. at 578 ("[W]hile there are some errors to which Chapman 
does not apply, they are the exceptions and not the rule.") (citing United States v. Hasting, 
461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983». 
120. Id. at 579. 
121. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); cf. Iowa v. Quintero, No. 90-44, 
1991 WL 207111 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1991) (construing due process clause of Iowa 
Constitution as prohibiting the application of harmless error analysis to the admission of a 
coerced confession), afJ'd on other grounds. No. 90-44, 1992 WL 6988 (Iowa Jan. 22, 1992). 
122. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
123. Id. at 1264. 
124. Id. at 1264-65. 
125. Id. at 1265. 
126. Id. at 1264. 
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of the right to counsel at trial, the deprivation of the right to self­
representation at trial, and the deprivation of the right to a public 
trial. 127 
C. Standard for Determining Harmlessness 
Determining which federal constitutional errors are subject to 
harmless error analysis leaves open the question of the appropriate 
standard by which such errors are to be deemed harmless. Both the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts have wavered on standards of 
harmlessness to be used in review of federal constitutional errors. 
The standard discussed in Chapman involved determining 
whether the erroneously admitted evidence might have contributed to 
the verdict. 128 This approach requires an evaluation of the possible 
effect that the erroneously admitted evidence may have had on the 
factfinder and disregards the sufficiency of evidence other than that 
which was erroneously admitted. 129 
The Supreme Court, however, has not been entirely clear on the 
process by which it determines that a particular error was harmless. 
Some early decisions of the Court appear to have relied on an "over­
whelming evidence" test. 130 Under this approach, an error will be 
deemed harmless if the evidence other than that which was illegally 
obtained is so overwhelming that it compels a guilty verdict.13I In 
later decisions, however, the Court returned to the Chapman Court's 
focus on the effect that the erroneously admitted evidence may have 
had on the jury verdict, emphasizing that the prosecution bears the 
127. Id. at 1265 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (exclusion of mem­
bers of defendant's race from grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) 
(the right to a public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (the right to self­
representation at trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (denial of right to 
counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge». 
128. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 (1967). 
129. Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness ofFederal Constitutional Error-A 
Process in Need o/a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976). 
130. See. e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). Harrington in­
volved the admission of several statements of a co-defendant who did not take the stand. 
Id. at 252. These statements were admitted in violation of the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment. Id. (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968». Although 
purporting to rely on the Chapman standard, the Court refused to reverse the conviction 
because "the case against Harrington was so overwhelming that [the Court] conclude[d] 
that [the] violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 254. See 
also id. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court holds that constitutional error in the 
trial of a criminal offense may be held harmless if there is 'overwhelming' untainted evi­
dence to support the conviction. This approach, however, was expressly rejected in Chap­
man . ...") (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23). 
131. Field, supra note 129, at 16-17. 
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burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneously 
admitted evidence did not affect the factfinder. \32 
III. BUTZIN V. WOOD 133 
The Supreme Court has not yet directly applied harmless error 
analysis to Miranda violations. 134 The lower courts that have con­
fronted the issue, however, have routinely applied the rule to Miranda 
violations. 13S Butzin, decided by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, illustrates the problems of such application. 
A. Facts 
On August 14, 1985, police officers found the dead bodies of 
David Butzin's pregnant wife, Melody Butzin, and his eighteen 
month-old son, Alex Butzin, in Cat Creek in Wadena County, Minne­
sota.136 When the police first discovered the bodies, they believed that 
the deaths were accidental and did not make a complete investigation 
132. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. 
Ct. 1246 (1991); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988). In Satterwhite, the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals had determined that the admission of certain testimony admit­
ted at the sentencing phase of a capital trial in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amend­
ment right to counsel was harmless error because the case for imposing the death penalty 
was "such that the minds of an average jury would have found the State's case ... sufficient 
... even if [the challenged testimony] had not been admitted." Id. at 258 (quoting Satter­
white v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), rev'd, 486 U.S. 249 (1988». In 
reversing the decision of the Texas court, the United States Supreme Court stated that 
"[t]he question ... is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support 
the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the State has proved 
'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.''' Id. at 258 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). The Court ultimately found 
that there was no way to declare that the evidence complained of did not affect the jury 
verdict. Id. at 260. 
133. 886 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2595 (1990). 
134. See supra note 16. 
135. See, e.g., Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 911 (1985); United States v. Packer, 730 F.2d 1151, 1157 (8th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 867 (1983); 
Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 875-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); 
United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 1372 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Charl­
ton, 565 F.2d 86, 91-93 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); Null v. Wain­
wright, 508 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 970 (1975); United States v. 
Hill, 430 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Jackson, 429 F.2d 1368, 1372 (7th 
Cir. 1970); Rock v. Zimmerman, 543 F. Supp. 179, 192 (M.D. Penn. 1982); State v. 
Vargus, 373 A.2d 150, 155 (R.I. 1977); State v. McDonald, 571 P.2d 930, 935 (Wash. 
1977). 
136. State v. Butzin, 404 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
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of the scene. 137 
Two days after the bodies were found, however, a local insurance 
agent notified the police that David Butzin had recently purchased a 
significant amount of insurance on his wife's life.138 The police then 
contacted Butzin's father-in-law and asked him to tell Butzin that the 
police wanted him to come in for questioning on August 26, 1985.139 
Butzin appeared at the police station at the requested time. 14O He was 
not formally arrested at that time, but, prior to questioning, the police 
gave Butzin the following warning: "You have the right to remain 
. silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have 
the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
appointed for you at no COSt."141 The questioning officer, Deputy 
Young, asked Butzin if he understood the rights that had just been 
read to him, and Butzin repli~d that he did. 142 
Young then proceeded to question Butzin for one hour. During 
this questioning session, Butzin responded to all of Young's questions, 
but did not implicate himself in the deaths of his wife and child. Nor 
did he at any time indicate that he wanted the questioning to cease, or 
that he wanted to speak to an attorney.143 
Butzin was then questioned for a period of between one-half and 
one hour by a private investigator hired by the county to assist in the 
investigation. It was during this questioning session that Butzin first 
indicated he was involved in the deaths. The investigator, Richard 
Polipnick, came into the questioning room after taking a break, and 
stated, "David, you're in a world of hurt, aren't you?" 144 He then 
asked Butzin to tell him what happened at Cat Creek. Butzin first 
stated that he saw his wife and child fall into the creek and that he 
panicked and ran away. Polipnick asked Butzin if he would give a 
written statement to the sheriff's deputies. When the deputies re­
turned, Butzin changed his story to indicate that he had "bumped" his 
137. Id. The police did, however, notice that there were two adult-sized sets of foot­
prints leading from Melody Butzin's car. Id. 
138. Id. Melody Butzin's life was insured for $239,000. There were a total of five 
different policies on Melody's life, three of which David Butzin had purchased within one 
week of his wife's death. There was also an application for another policy worth $25,000, 
which was pending at the time of her death. Alex Butzin's life was also insured for $6,000. 
Id. 
139. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1017. 
140. Id. 
141. Butzin, 404 N.W.2d at 822-23. For a discussion of the adequacy of this warn­
ing, see infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text. 
142. Butzin, 404 N.W.2d at 823. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
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wife and child into the creek.14S The officers then took Butzin's writ­
ten statement and placed him under arrest. 
After spending the night in jail, Butzin requested to speak with 
Deputy Young. It was at this time that Butzin confessed to intention­
ally killing Melody and Alex. 146 There was no indication that Young 
gave Butzin another Miranda warning. In addition, there was no indi­
cation that Butzin was mistreated during the night. 147 
Butzin was charged with second degree murder. At trial, the 
prosecution introduced Butzin's incriminating statements into evi­
dence, over Butzin's objection. Butzin was convicted and sentenced to 
thirty-two and one-half years in prison. 148 Butzin appealed his 
conviction. 
B. Decision of the Minnesota Court ofAppeals 
On appeal, Butzin raised, inter alia, the issue of the adequacy of 
the Miranda warning he received. 149 Butzin argued that because the 
police did not inform him of his right to have counsel present during 
interrogation, the Miranda warning which was given was inade­
quate. ISO The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed and found that 
Butzin had received an adequate Miranda warning. lSI Finding incon­
sistent precedent,IS2 the court nonetheless held that Miranda wam­
145. This statement made by Butzin will be referred to as Butzin's "first confession." 
146. Butzin, 404 N.W.2d at 823. Butzin stated that he went to the stream with Alex 
and Melody to catch minnows. He stated that as he walked down the bank of the creek 
towards his wife, he made up his mind to kill her. He stated that he intentionally pushed 
her into the creek with Alex in her arms, knowing that neither could swim. Id. This 
statement will be referred to as Butzin's "second confession." 
147. The confessions which Butzin gave to the police would not be considered viola­
tive of the coerced confession doctrine of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See 
supra note 10. Butzin was apparently treated decently. He was given breakfast in the 
morning and was offered coffee and milk during the interrogation. Butzin, 404 N.W.2d at 
827. 
148. Butzin, 404 N.W.2d at 824. Butzin received a sentence of 180 months ofincar­
ceration for Melody's death and 210 months for Alex's death. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 825. 
152. Id. at 824-25 (citing South Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65, 70 (8th Cir. 1972) 
(holding invalid a warning that did not specifically apprise the defendant of his right to 
have an attorney present during questioning), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973); Evans v. 
Swenson, 455 F.2d 291, 295-96 (8th Cir.) (holding that a warning which included state­
ments that the defendant had the right to make a phone call, and had the right to an 
attorney, clearly suggested that the defendant had a right to call an attorney before ques­
tioning), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972); Tasby v. United States, 451 F.2d 394, 398-99 
(8th Cir. 1971) (holding that a warning which stated that "an attorney would be appointed 
at the proper time" was adequate), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922 (1972». 
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ings are to be judged from a common sense viewpoint, and that it is 
sufficient that the statements given, when considered together, "con­
vey the substance of the defendant's constitutional rights."ls3 Here, 
this standard was met because Butzin was informed that he "had an 
unqualified right to have an attorney present in general, and that he 
was entitled to the presence of an attorney before [the] questioning 
began."ls4 The court also stressed that the warning Butzin received 
did not limit the right to have counsel present at any particular phase 
of the investigation. ISS 
The court also questioned whether Butzin was in custody for 
Miranda purposes at the time of his first confession. ls6 In determining 
whether Butzin was in custody, the court stated that the appropriate 
test was "whether there [was] a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom 
of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest."IS7 Since 
Butzin had come to the police station on his own initiative, was not 
placed under arrest, and was not informed that he was not free to 
leave, the court found that Butzin was not in custody at the time of his 
first confession. ISS 
Butzin also argued that even if the warning that the police gave 
was adequate, the police needed to give him a second warning before 
obtaining the second confession. In rejecting this argument, the court 
stated that the appropriate standard for determining whether a second 
warning was necessary was "whether the lack of a second warning left 
the defendant unaware of the meaning or seriousness of the second 
interrogation."ls9 According to the court, the police were not re­
quired to give Butzin a second warning because he knew the purpose 
of the interrogation that led to his second confession and because he 
had initiated the conversation with Deputy Young. l60 The court em­
phasized that Butzin had admitted that he was aware of his constitu­
tional rights prior to the making of the second confession. 161 
Butzin then sought federal habeas corpus relief. The Federal Dis­
trict Court for the District of Minnesota denied Butzin's petition. 162 




157. Id. (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124-25 (1983». 
158. [d. at 826. 
159. [d. (quoting State v. Andrews, 388 N.W.2d 723, 731 (Minn. 1986». 
160. [d. 
161. [d. 
162. See Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1989), cerro denied, 110 S. Ct. 
2595 (1990). 
133 1992] APPLYING HARMLESS ERROR TO MIRANDA 
Butzin then appealed this decision to the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Eighth Circuit. 
C. 	 Decision of the United States Court ofAppeals for the Eighth 
Circuit 
1. Majority Opinion 
The majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of Butzin's petition. 163 The court 
first addressed the admissibility of the second confession. l64 Conced­
ing that Butzin was in custody at the time of this confession,165 the 
court nonetheless held that this statement was admissible because it 
was a volunteered statement and not the product of interrogation. 166 
Hence, it would be admissible without regard to the adequacy of the 
Miranda warning he received. 167 
The court next addressed the issue of the admissibility of Butzin's 
first confession. 168 The court acknowledged that there was some ques­
tion as to whether Butzin was in custody at the time of his first state­
ment. 169 However, the majority found it unnecessary to address the 
issue of whether Butzin was in custody for Miranda purposes at the 
time of the first confession.l7° Instead, the court relied on the hann­
less error rule. The court first noted that the defendant's own counsel 
had acknowledged that it was the second confession which was re­
sponsible for Butzin's conviction.171 The court agreed with this char­
acterization, and since the court had already determined that there 
163. 	 Id. at 1019. 
164. 	 Id. at 1018. 
165. Butzin was in custody t>ecause he had been formally arrested and placed in ajaiJ 
cell overnight. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. 
166. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1018. The court pointed to two factors that made this state­
ment spontaneous and not in response to interrogation. First, Butzin initiated the conver­
sation with the police. Second, the court argued that this statement was not in response to 
the interrogation of the day before. According to the court, since Butzin had already made 
a statement, he was not under a great deal of pressure to make another statement. Also, 
the interrogation session had ended the day before. Thus, his second confession was not in 
response to the questioning of the day before and was, therefore, volunteered. Id. 
167. 	 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
168. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1019. ( 
C' 169. Id. 
170. 	 Id. 
171. Id. The defendant's appellate brief stated that Butzin's first confession was a 
"relatively innocuous, cryptic disclosure. . .. Butzin makes it sound accidental. . " His 
first confession was not the stuff of premeditated murder, rather, arguably it's [a] man­
slaughter type confession and it was certainly not what convicted him. The second state­
ment ... provided the proof of intent." Id. (quoting Brief for Appellant, Butzin v. Wood, 
886 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1989» (alteration in original). 
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was no Miranda violation in admitting the second confession, the 
court concluded that the admission of the first confession could not 
have prejudiced Butzin.172 The court also pointed to two other in­
criminating statements Butzin had made which were admitted at 
trial,173 and to the evidence of the insurance coverage which was ad­
mitted to the jury.174 Therefore, according to the court, the admission 
of the first statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 175 
2. Concurrence 
Judge Beam wrote a brief concurrence. Judge Beam believed that 
under the Supreme Court's recent Duckworth decision, the warning 
given to Butzin was adequate. 176 In Duckworth, the police gave the 
defendant a warning which included the language that a lawyer would 
be appointed "if and when you go to court."177 Judge Beam found 
that this warning was "a far greater departure from the specific pro­
nouncements set forth in Miranda v. Arizona than the warning given 
Butzin."178 
3. Dissent 
In his dissent, Chief Judge Lay criticized the majority for failing 
to address the major issue on appeal by employing the harmless error 
rule. 179 To the dissent, the major issue was whether Butzin was given 
an adequate Miranda warning. 180 According to the dissent, Butzin 
was never given an adequate warning because he was never expressly 
172. Id. 
173. Id. Butzin had told Melody's father that he was responsible for Melody going 
into the water. While being transported to court, Butzin also stated to one of the officers 
who had investigated the crime: "I know that I am guilty and that I have done wrong, but 
I have to go to court to beat it ..It's the best chance I have." Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. (Beam, J., concurring) (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989». 
177. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198. 
178. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1019 (Beam, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Judge 
Beam's argument that the warning given to Butzin was less of a departure from the warn­
ing given to the defendant in Duckworth can be criticized by pointing out that in Duck­
worth the defendant had been told of his right to have counsel present during questioning 
before the controversial phrase "if and when you go to court" was added. In Butzin, how- " 
ever, the defendant was never told of his right to have counsel present during questioning. 
For the text of the warning given to the defendant in Duckworth, see supra note 64. For 
the text of the warning given to Butzin, see supra text accompanying note 141. 
179. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1020 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Lay stated that 
"[t ]he basic fallacy of the majority opinion relates to the finding that certain incriminating 
statements given by the defendant were harmless error." Id. at 1019. 
180. Id. 
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advised of his right to have counsel present during interrogation. lSI 
Additionally, the dissent argued that Butzin's second confession 
could not be separated from his prior custodial interrogation of the 
day before. ls2 Chief Judge Lay argued that this case was unlike Ore­
gon v. Elstad,ls3 which the majority relied on. In Elstad, the Supreme 
Court held that, because of the nonapplicability of the fruit of the poi­
sonous tree doctrine, a statement obtained in violation of Miranda did 
not necessarily prevent the admission of a second confession that was 
not in violation of Miranda. ls4 In Elstad, however, the defendant was 
given an adequate Miranda warning prior to making the second con­
fession. lss According to the dissent, this case was unlike Elstad be­
cause Butzin was never given an adequate Miranda warning before his 
second confession.ls6 Chief Judge Lay also argued that because But­
zin was never given an adequate Miranda warning, it would not be 
possible to argue that Butzin had waived his rights. ls7 
IV. 	 ApPLYING THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE TO MIRANDA 
VIOLATIONS 
The Butzin decision raises two issues encountered in applying the 
harmless error rule to Miranda violations. The first issue is whether 
Miranda violations may be subjected to harmless error analysis. The 
second issue involves determining the standard by which such errors, 
if susceptible to harmless error analysis, are to be deemed harmless. 
This section concludes that Miranda violations should be subjected to 
harmless error analysis and suggests that courts should apply the 
Chapman standard of harmlessness to Miranda violations. This sec­
tion then illustrates the application of the Chapman standard of harm­
lessness to Butzin v. Wood. 
181. Id. at 1021 (citing Duckworth, 492 U.S. 195; United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 
610 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding a warning inadequate where the investigating officer failed to 
inform a defendant that he had a right to counsel during questioning as well as before 
questioning); Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding a warning 
defective that merely told a defendant that he could "speak with an attorney or anyone else 
before saying anything at all"». 
182. Id. at 1022. The dissent argued that even "[a)ssuming one could say that the 
second statement was voluntary, ... it [was) not a separate and isolated instance from the 
fact that the defendant had previously made his incriminating statements the day before." 
Id. 
183. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
184. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
185. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301. 
186. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1020 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). 
187. Id. 
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A. 	 Should Harmless Error Analysis be Applied to Miranda 
Violations? 
The lower courts have routinely applied the harmless error rule to 
Miranda violations. 188 The United States Supreme Court, however, 
has not yet directly applied harmless error analysis to Miranda viola­
tions. 189 A review of the violations to which the Court has applied 
harmless error analysis, however, indicates that the Court would apply 
harmless error analysis to Miranda violations. 19o 
Under the approach taken by the Court in Arizona v. Fulmi­
nante,191 Miranda violations would fall under the definition of "trial 
errors."192 Miranda involves the exclusion of evidence from presenta­
tion to the jury. The violation of Miranda is unlike those violations 
listed by the Court in Fulminante as structural defects because 
Miranda violations do not affect the entire trial process. Rather, these 
violations affect only the presentation of evidence to the jury. 
There are also no major doctrinal difficulties involved in applying 
the harmless error rule to Miranda violations. 193 Under the Chapman 
decision, in order to avoid application of harmless error analysis, 
Miranda warnings would have to be classified as rights fundamental to 
a fair trial. 194 The Miranda requirements, however, possess none of 
the characteristics traditionally considered as belonging to a funda­
mental right. 195 
188. 	 See supra note 135. 
189. 	 See supra note 16. 
190. The Court has applied harmless error analysis to the admission of confessions 
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment and to confessions obtained in violation of 
the coerced confession doctrine. See Arizona v. Fulminante, III S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (apply­
ing harmless error analysis to the admission of a coerced confession); Satterwhite v. Texas, 
486 U.S. 249 (1988) (applying harmless error analysis to the admission of a confession 
obtained in violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel). The Court has also indicated 
that lower courts are free to apply harmless error analysis to Miranda violations. See 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2652 n.22 (1990) (stating that the state court was 
free on remand to determine whether the admission of the statement was harmless error). 
191. 	 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
192. 	 See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text. 
193. But see Goldberg, supra note 15, at 441- 42 (suggesting that harmless error anal­
ysis should never be applied to a federal constitutional violation). 
194. 	 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967). 
195. See Robert Pondolfi, Comment, Principles/or Application o/the Harmless Error 
Standard, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 616, 620-26 (1974). In this article, the author suggests 
several factors for determining whether a right is so fundamental that its violation must 
result in automatic reversal. These factors are: the explicitness of the constitutional guar­
antee, the strength of the congressional will favoring the right, and the historical entrench­
ment of the right. Id. Under these factors, the Miranda requirements would not be 
considered fundamental. The requirements are based on the Fifth Amendment, which does 
not explicitly require the warnings. See supra note 3 for the text of the Fifth Amendment. 
1992] APPLYING HARMLESS ERROR TO MIRANDA 137 
Moreover, there are no significant policy concerns dictating that 
harmless error analysis should not be applied to Miranda .196 Viola­
tions of Miranda occur frequently, and the benefit of the harmless er­
ror rule is that it enables courts to ignore confessions which are not 
prejudicial to the defendant and thus avoid unnecessary litigation. 197 
Once it is determined that harmless error analysis should be applied to 
Miranda violations, the question becomes one of identifying the ap­
propriate standard for determining the harmlessness of the Miranda 
error. 
B. Standard for Determining Harmlessness 
A violation of Miranda means that a defendant's confession198 
Also, Congress has not favored the Miranda requirements, as e"idenced by its attempt to 
statutorily override the decision. See supra note 2. Moreover, the Miranda case was de­
cided in 1966, and therefore the requirements are not historically entrenched in our society. 
The lower courts that have considered the issue have also uniformly rejected the classi­
fication of the Miranda requirements as rights basic to a fair trial, and have used two 
justifications for doing so. The first is that there is a distinction between the Miranda 
requirement, which is only a procedure for protecting an individual's Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights, and the constitutional rights themselves. See Null v. Wainwright, 508 
F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.) (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974», cen. denied, 421 
U.S. 970 (1975). Although the constitutional rights themselves may be fundamental, the 
violation of the procedure designed to protect those rights does not mean that the rights 
themselves were violated. 
Another justification which courts have used in determining that Miranda require­
ments are not "so basic to a fair trial that their violation could never be considered harm­
less" is that the Miranda decision was not made retroactive. In Johnson v. New Jersey, the 
Supreme Court held that Miranda would only be applied to trials that occurred after the 
Miranda decision. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966). Lower courts have 
reasoned that since Miranda was not made retroactive, the Supreme Court itself does not 
consider the requirements fundamental to a fair trial. See. e.g., Guyette v. State, 438 P.2d 
244,248 (Nev. 1968); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 237 A.2d 209, 211 (Pa. 1968); Cardwell 
v. Commonwealth, 164 S.E.2d 699, 701-02 (Va. 1968). 
196. The only policy concern presented by the application of the harmless error rule 
to Miranda violations is that such application may not deter prosecutors from introducing 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda. This concern, however, is present whenever 
harmless error analysis is applied to a constitutional violation. 
197. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
198. Although the Miranda requirements apply to both inculpatory and exculpatory 
statements, the term "confession" is used here to indicate any statement obtained in viola­
tion of Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Although a defendant 
may have intended his or her statement to be exculpatory at the time the statement was 
made, the prosecution would not normally introduce the statement unless the statement 
somehow inculpates the defendant. An illustration of this principle occurred in Escobedo 
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the police questioned the defendant about his 
role in a murder. The defendant, apparently not knowing that his statement would incul­
pate him, stated to the police that he was at the scene of the murder but did not shoot the 
victim. The defendant was subsequently convicted under a concert of action theory. Id.; 
see also Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 424 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
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has been erroneously admitted into evidence. Because Miranda viola­
tions always involve the defendant's own statements, harmless error 
analysis should be very carefully applied. This need for close analysis 
results from the unique evidentiary value of a confession. A confes­
sion is " 'probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can 
be admitted against [a defendant].' "199 A defendant's own confession 
has been described as "so damaging that a jury should not be expected 
to ignore it even if told to do so. "200 
Even though a confession admitted in violation of Miranda is 
usually highly prejudicial to a defendant, applying the harmless error 
rule to Miranda violations is still appropriate. When undertaking 
harmless error analysis, however, a reviewing court must be careful to 
focus on the possible effect on the jury verdict, rather than on the 
sufficiency of the other evidence. 
In Arizona v. Fulminante 201 and Yates v. Evatt,202 the Supreme 
Court made clear that the Chapman standard is the appropriate stan­
dard for determining the harmlessness of federal constitutional errors. 
In both cases, the Court found that a particular constitutional error 
alleged to be harmless was not in fact harmless, stating that the test for 
determining the harmlessness of a constitutional error requires the 
prosecution to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the erroneously 
admitted evidence did not affect the verdict obtained.203 
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir­
cuit also emphasized the need for a reviewing court to focus on the 
possible effect of the erroneously admitted evidence on the jury verdict 
when employing harmless error analysis.204 In Collazo v. Estelle,205 
the court found that an erroneously admitted confession was not 
harmless error.206 In so doing, the court emphasized that the prosecu­
199. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1255 (1991) (quoting Cruz v. New 
York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting»; see also id. at 1266-67 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) ("Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the crime, one would have difficulty 
finding evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant's plea of innocence [than his own 
statement]."). 
200. Id. at 1255 (White, J., dissenting in part) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123, 140 (1968) (White, J., dissenting». 
201. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
202. 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991). 
203. Id. at 1897; Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1258-59. 
204. Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 426. The court found that the confession was inadmissible because 
"[n]either [the defendant's] ... alleged Miranda waiver, nor his custodial confession were 
voluntary, as that term applies either to the conduct of the police, or to [the defendant's] 
subjective reaction to police overreaching." Id. 
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tion had made extensive references to the confession at trial, and it was 
therefore impossible to declare that the admission of the confession 
into evidence did not affect the jury verdict. 207 
C. Illustration 
The following section illustrates the problems encountered by ap­
plying the harmless error rule to Miranda violations through an analy­
sis of Butzin v. Wood. 208 This section begins with a discussion of the 
admissibility of both of Butzin's confessions under Miranda. The sec­
tion then discusses the application of the appropriate standard of 
harmlessness to the facts of Butzin and concludes that the Butzin 
court reached an incorrect result in its harmless error analysis. 
1. Miranda Analysis 
In Butzin v. Wood, the majority began its analysis with the issue 
of the admissibility of the second confession.209 Finding that this 
statement was not obtained in violation ofMiranda, the court went on 
to find that the admission of the first statement was harmless in light 
of the admission of the second confession.210 In order for the majority 
to use this analysis, it must have implicitly assumed that the first state­
ment was a Miranda violation. However, the majority failed to dis­
cuss why Butzin involved a Miranda violation. 
A more appropriate analysis would have been for the court to 
first determine whether Butzin was being subjected to custodial inter­
rogation at the time of his first confession,2l1 and then· determine 
whether he was given an adequate warning. 212 If this analysis yielded 
a determination that admission of Butzin's first confession was in vio­
lation of Miranda, then the court should have applied the same steps 
to the admission of his second confession. This analysis is more ap­
propriate because it would give more guidance on the Miranda re­
quirements to trial courts, prosecutors, and investigating officers by 
refining both the requirements of an adequate Miranda warning and 
207. Id. at 425-26. The court emphasized that the prosecution used Collazo's con­
fession in cross-examination to discredit Collazo's trial testimony. Also, the court empha­
sized that the prosecution, in its closing argument to the jury, relied heavily on Collazo's 
confession to "cement its case," to attack the credibility of Collazo's testimony, and to 
impugn his theory of defense. 
208. 886 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2595 (1990). 
209. Id. at 1018. 
210. Id. at 1019. 
211. See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
140 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14: 109 
the application of the Miranda custody test.213 
In applying this analysis to the first confession, the first question 
that needs to be addressed is whether the police subjected Butzin to 
custodial interrogation at the time of his first confession.214 Although 
Butzin did come to the police station on his own initiative, he was in 
custody at some point during the interrogation. At one point during 
the first interrogation session, the private investigator hired by the 
county asked Butzin" '[w]hy don't you tell me what happened out 
there at Cat Creek, David'? Butzin replied: 'I lied, I was there.' "215 
The investigator left the room and returned with two sheriff's depu­
ties. 216 There are two facts which would support a finding that, at this 
point, Butzin was in custody. First, he was in a police station and 
surrounded by police officers.217 Since he had just indicated to the 
police that he was involved in the deaths of his wife and child, Butzin 
would have had a reasonable belief that he was in custody at that 
point.2ls Second, although Butzin was never told that he was under 
arrest before he made his first confession, he was not told that he was 
not under arrest.219 There was also no dispute that the police were 
interrogating Butzin at the time of his first confession because the po­
lice were expressly questioning Butzin at the time he made the first 
statement.220 Therefore, it appears that the first confession was the 
result of a custodial interrogation. 
The next issue is to determine whether the warning that the police 
gave Butzin was adequate. 221 An adequate Miranda warning requires 
that the suspect be expressly advised of his right to have counsel pres­
2\3. See Martha S. Davis & Stevan A. Childress, Standards of Review in Criminal 
Appeals: Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TULANE L. REV. 461, 470 (1986). 
The unfortunate side of harmless error is that it often prevents full review. 
Rather than apply technical standards to the process below, the reviewing court 
may affirm the action below by relying on its feeling that, based on the whole 
record, the end result below was probably justified, and thus, any errors in the 
process of reaching the end result must have been harmless. 
Id. 
214. See Smith, supra note 43, at 699. 




218. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
219. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that de­
fendant who was expressly told that he was not under arrest was not in custody for 
Miranda purposes). 
220. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1017. 
221. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
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ent during interrogation.222 This requirement was not met here. 
Although the police told Butzin that he had a right to counsel, they 
did not inform him that he had the right to have counsel present dur­
ing the interrogation.223 Because Butzin was being subjected to custo­
dial interrogation at the time of his first confession, and was not given 
an adequate warning, the admission of this confession was in violation 
of Miranda. 224 
2. Harmless Error Analysis 
Once a court has determined that a confession was admitted in 
violation of Miranda, it becomes appropriate to determine whether its 
222. See supra notes 32, 64 and accompanying text. 
223. For the text of the warning given to Butzin, see supra text accompanying note 
141. 
224. The Butzin court also found that Butzin's second confession was admissible 
because it was not the product of police interrogation. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1018. This 
result is questionable. Because Butzin had been formally arrested at the time of his second 
confession and had not yet been given an adequate Miranda warning, the only way that the 
second statement could not be a Miranda violation would be if it were not the result of 
interrogation. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. The Eighth Circuit majority 
found that the second confession was not the result of interrogation because Butzin had 
requested to speak with the police on his own initiative. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1018. 
Although Butzin's request to speak with the officers was voluntary, the resulting confession 
was the product of interrogation. Butzin was removed from his cell and was questioned on 
the details of his involvement in the crime. His confession was not a response to routine 
booking questions, and the officers did not merely request clarification of Butzin's ambigu­
ous statements. Rather, they removed him from his cell and questioned him for a length of 
time. The Eighth Circuit relied on United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1032 (4th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986), United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942, 946 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977), vacated on other grounds, 435 U.S. 912 (1978), and 
United States V. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 521-22 (D.C. Cir. 1980) for the proposition that 
spontaneous statements are not affected by the Miranda rule. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1018. In 
those cases, however, the police did not question the suspect for a significant amount of 
time. 
IfButzin's second confession were found to be inadmissible, his conviction would have 
to be reversed. This confession was extremely prejudicial to Butzin, and its admission into 
evidence could not be considered harmless under either the overwhelming evidence or the 
Chapman standards of harmlessness. Although the jury was exposed to the evidence of the 
insurance coverage, there was no physical evidence linking Butzin to the crime. Because 
the police originally thought that the deaths were accidental, they did not collect any physi­
cal evidence at the scene of the deaths. See id. The only physical evidence collected at the 
scene was the evidence that there were two adult-sized sets of footprints near Melody But­
zin's car. Id. There was, however, no evidence indicating that these footprints belonged to 
David Butzin. Because of the lack of physical evidence, the conviction could not be sus­
tained under an overwhelming evidence standard of harmlessness without the admission 
into evidence of Butzin's second confession. Nor could Butzin's conviction be sustained 
under the Chapman standard of harmlessness. It would be impossible to declare, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that a confession which contained the only proof of intent, a necessary 
element of the crime charged, did not contribute to Butzin's conviction. 
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admission was harmless error. Different standards for determining 
harmlessness have been utilized by the courts,225 and a review of But­
zin in light of these standards illustrates that the choice of standards 
can affect the outcome of a case. In determining that the admission of 
the first confession was harmless, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Cit:cuit focused on the other "overwhelming evidence" 
against Butzin.226 The court, however, failed to address the possible 
ways in which the introduction of the first confession could have af­
fected the jury verdict. 
In Butzin, there was enough evidence other than the first confes­
sion to avoid reversal of Butzin's conviction under the overwhelming 
evidence standard of harmlessness.227 However, under the Chapman 
standard, it is certainly possible that the introduction of the first con­
fession may have affected the jury's verdict by damaging Butzin's at­
tempt to discredit his second confession. The problem with the 
overwhelming evidence approach to determining harmlessness is that 
the introduction of a tainted piece of evidence becomes virtually risk­
free for the prosecution.228 By using the overwhelming evidence ap­
proach to determining harmlessness, the Butzin court allowed the 
prosecution to avoid the risks associated with the introduction of the 
first confession. 
Under Chapman, in order for a reviewing court to find an error 
harmless, it must be able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the erroneously admitted confession did not affect the jury's verdict.229 
When undertaking this analysis, a reviewing court "must entertain 
with an open mind the possibility that at least one member of the jury 
[was affected by the evidence]."23o 
Under this standard, it is possible that the admission of Butzin's 
first confession affected the jury's verdict. Arguably, the first confes­
225. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
226. Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1019 (1989) ("In light of the overwhelming 
evidence of Butzin's guilt, we conclude that the admission of the first statement, if error, 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (citation omitted». 
227. See State v. Butzin, 404 N.W.2d 819, 822-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). Other 
than Butzin's first confession, the jury was exposed to the evidence of the insurance cover­
age, the second confession, the other incriminating statements made by Butzin, and the 
evidence that there were two adult-sized sets of footprints at the death scene. See supra 
notes 138, 173 and accompanying text. Without Butzin's second confession, however, But­
zin's conviction could not have been sustained under the overwhelming evidence standard 
of harmlessness. See supra note 224. 
228. Arizona v. Fulminante, III S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991). 
229. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
230. Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1097 (6th Cir. 1990), cerl. denied, III 
S. Ct. 1608 (1991). 
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sion could be considered harmless in light of the second confession 
because the second confession was more inculpatory than the first.231 
However, the existence of a later admissible confession does not neces­
sarily render the admission of the first confession harmless. For exam­
ple, in Arizona v. Fulminante ,232 the Court found that a coerced 
confession admitted in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause was not haqnless error, despite the admission into evi­
dence at trial of a legally obtained confession to the same crime.233 
The Court found that the first confession could have affected the jury's 
verdict by lending credibility to the second confession.234 
This possibility is also present in Butzin. In Butzin, the defendant 
attempted to discredit the confessions he had made -to the police.235 
At his trial, Butzin testified that he had falsely confessed to the killings 
because he felt responsible for the drownings.236 He testified that he 
felt responsible because he had not allowed his wife to purchase min­
nows for their son.237 Apparently, his theory was that his wife and 
son would not have been at the creek, and would not have accidentally 
drowned, if he had allowed his wife to buy the minnows. Butzin ar­
gued that because of these guilty feelings, he confessed to the killings. 
This argument would have had a much greater chance of success 
if the jury had not been exposed to Butzin's first confession. Once the 
jury had heard that Butzin had confessed before the second confes­
sion, it became unlikely that the jury would believe that both confes­
sions were false. This is especially true considering that Butzin had a 
night free of questioning before making the second ·confession.238 
Therefore, the admission of the first confession damaged this argu­
231. For the content of the two confessions that Butzin gave to the police, see supra 
notes 144-46 and accompanying text. 
232. III S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 1258-59. In Fu/minante, the defendant made two confessions. One of the 
confessions was made to a police agent while the defendant was in prison. This confession 
was found to be coerced. Id. at 1251-52. Fulminante then made a second confession to the 
police agent's wife. This confession was found to be free of constitutional infirmity. The 
Court found that the admission of the first confession was not harmless because it made the 
second confession more credible. Id. at 1258-61. Because of the lack of physical evidence, 
the successful prosecution of the case depended on the jury believing the confessions. Id. at 
1258. The Court found that the admission of the first confession could have made the 
second confession appear more credible to the jury because the first confession contained 
some details that corroborated the second confession. Id. 
235. See State v. Butzin, 404 N.W.2d 819, 822-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Because the jury knew that Butzin had a night free of questioning after making 
an initial confession, it could have reasonably believed that Butzin's second confession was 
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ment and could possibly have affected the jury verdict.239 
CONCLUSION 
A reviewing court should be free to apply harmless error analysis 
to Miranda violations. When such analysis is employed, however, a 
reviewing court should be careful to focus on the possible effect a con­
fession obtained in violation of Miranda had on the jury verdict. The 
court should explore the various ways in which the defendant's state­
ments may have affected the verdict when determining whether their 
admission was harmless.24O This higher standard of care is necessary 
because of the unique evidentiary value of a confession. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the necessity of this higher 
level of care in the context of a coerced confession,241 as well as in the 
context of the admission of a confession obtained in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.242 Because Miranda violations always involve the 
defendant's own statements, the same concerns present in the context 
of the admission of coerced confessions and confessions obtained in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment are also present in the context of 
confessions obtained in violation of Miranda. Yet, as the Butzin deci­
sion indicates, courts have not analyzed the impact of an erroneously 
admitted confession in light of this unique evidentiary impact. Faith­
ful adherence to the Chapman standard of harmless error would effec­
tively protect the right to a jury trial. 
John J. Henry 
not spontaneous. Therefore, the jury may have found the second confession to be more 
credible as a product of Butzin's conscious choice to confess. 
239. The first confession could also have affected the jury verdict by making the jury 
more hostile towards Butzin. In his first statement, Butzin said that after he had acciden­
tally bumped his wife and child into the river, he "watched them go down the river." 
Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1017. The fact that Butzin watched the victims go down the river may 
have made the jury more hostile towards Butzin. 
240. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("[In order] for an error to be 'harmless' it must have made no contribution to a criminal 
conviction." (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967»). 
241. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1257-60 (1991). 
242. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988). 
